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Making Our Home in the Works

of God: Lutherans on the Civil
Use of the Law
Marie A. Failinger and Patrick R. Keifert

If anyone attempted to rule the world by the gospel and to abol
ish all temporal law and sword on the plea that all are baptized
and Christian and that, according to the gospel, there shall be

among them no law or sword—or need for either—pray tell me,

friend, what would he be doing? He would be loosing the ropes
and chains of the savage wild beasts and letting them bite and

mangle everyone, while insisting that they were harmless, tame,
and gentle creatures.
—Martin Luther, "On Temporal Authority"

The fact is that in the sight of God those who are most devoted
to the works of the law are farthest from fulfilling the law, be
cause they lack the Spirit that is the true fulfiller of the law, and

while they may attempt it by their own powers, they achieve

nothing.
—Luther, "The Bondage of the Will"

In the past two centuries, the Lutheran witness has focused so criti
cally and incessantly on grace, for which the law’s condemnation
merely prepares us, that Luthers “first” or “civil” use of the law is often
386
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overshadowed.1 Indeed, Luther’s insight that salvation cannot be a human
work—that recognition of one’s need for salvation is itself a gift of God—is so
radical and extreme as to lead a careless reader to believe that in the moment of
faith, the law vaporizes like a Romulan warrior into the ions of space.2 Or
Christians might imagine salvation as jurisdictional: for a Christian to pass over
into grace is to leave behind a godless country for a new land overflowing with
love and all good virtues. The Lutheran insight into law’s civil or political use in
God’s creative governance offers a very different vision, one that startles
modernity. Modern culture offers two stark choices: the optimistic view of law
as dynamic means toward a good society and human perfection (a view shared

by liberals, Utopians, and Marxists, among others); or law as an evil embodi
ment of oppressive power that should be, but is not, governed by equality and
relationality (as some in the critical legal studies movement, for example,
would argue). The Lutheran vision is perhaps more fitting to a matured plural
istic culture, whose hope in a new land of (material-political) milk and honey
has been shaken by limitation, the end of the frontier and uncomplicated civi
lization, and dashed prospects of a universal formula for peace. For the
Lutheran insight into law is at once darkly realistic that evil is inevitable even
within law and blithely optimistic that law can do good in this world; it imag
ines law as wrathful and loving, punishing and nurturing, restraining and free
ing. It is fully egalitarian in its condemnation; fully inclusive in its demand for
justice and care.

1. The underplaying of the first, “civil” use of the law is a profound effect of the Enlight
enment. Luthers premodern doctrine that the grace of law is an expression of creation and
human reason has collided with (especially American) modernism, which substitutes secular
for “sectarian” theological categories: in modernism, creation becomes nature, reason be
comes science, and law claims to be less human—“not of men but reason [alone].”
2. Alister E. McGrath argues that Luther’s distinctive breakthrough was to reject the claim
of the “via moderna” that humans played a limited but crucial part in their own salvation by
recognizing their need for salvation and appealing to God to bestow Gods covenantal offer
of salvation on them. Luther denied that human beings played any part at all in their own
salvation. Alister E. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross 88-90, 128-36 (Cambridge,
1990). See Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological
Writings 181 (Timothy Lull ed., Fortress 1989). This anthology is cited throughout because of
its availability. Because this essay is a contemporary interpretation rather than a history of
Lutheran doctrine, our sources are primarily Luther or late-twentieth-century Luther schol
arship. As shorthand, we will refer to “Lutheran” claims as though they were uniform, even
though Lutheran thought is very diverse, and others within various Lutheran communities
and in other Protestant traditions read Luther differently.
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For Luther, to receive the gift of grace is not to pass, as it were, from the
country of law to the new and very different country of loving freedom. Nor do
mainstream Lutherans view the world as dualist, an untransformable world of
law in which Christians must serve within fixed, static systems of authority and
a completely separate faith-kingdom where they are obligated to live out Chris
tian principles, a common Protestant interpretation of the two-kingdoms doc
trine.3 To be a Christian in the world is more like being the salt in a bland meal,
the yeast in a loaf of bread. The salt and yeast are distinctive and yet not sepa
rate; for the world to be fully what it is, that Christian spice, that leavening is re
quired. Christians have no need of the law, Luther writes, and in the very same
moment, they are unrepentant lawbreakers, needing law to order and nurture
human relationship.4 They participate simultaneously within the grace of the

law and the grace of the promise of life in Jesus Christ. Or as Luther also
claimed, there are so few true Christians who live purely out of grace among so
many sinners (even those who profess to be Christian) that the law is vitally
necessary to restrain evil and demand good. Even these few true Christians who
have no need of the law must obey the law for the sake of others who do need
it, just as sinners are justified by grace through faith, not just for their own sake
but for the sinner’s “neighbors”—that is, for all creatures.5

PRINCIPLES FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
POLITICAL USE OF LAW

Because Lutheran understandings about law are complex and deliberately
open-ended, they offer guidance about the making, interpretation, and ad
ministration of law mostly by preclusion: they can rule out some claims alto
gether and act as a corrective to any jurisprudence demanding to be embraced
as ultimate, flawless, or final justice. Yet although Lutheran doctrine does not
definitively point to a particular school of legal thought as most theologically

correct, it yields some important principles for understanding the political use
of law.

3. See, e.g., supra this volume, David Smolin, A House Divided? Anabaptist and Lutheran
Perspectives on the Sword.
4. Martin Luther, On the Freedom of the Christian, in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological
Writings, supra note 2, at 601, 606, 610, 613-14 (hereinafter The Freedom of the Christian).
5. See Martin Luther, On Temporal Authority, in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writ
ings, supranote 2, at 663, 665, 668-69 (hereinafter On Temporal Authority).
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Formation and Justification of Law

In its civil use, law is the demand of God for preservation and re-creation of the
world, expressed through such orders of creation as the family and the state. In
the Lutheran view, aligned in a distinctive way with the natural-law tradition,
law is largely the product of human reason, which is itself a gift of God to all hu
man beings.6 Lutherans reject both the concept that human law is divinely spo
ken word for word, a narrative continuous with the Giving of the Law at Sinai;
and a Deist view that because God’s creative activity is over, law is fully the work
of created beings capable of managing their own affairs. Mainstream Lutheran
theology rejects the notion that the worlds evil makes it untransformable or
obliges Christians to separate themselves to follow the way of Jesus as some
Christian traditions believe.7 For Lutherans, through the continuing creative
activity of human beings, every moment of which God makes possible and
makes new, law comes forth, and Christians participate on virtually the same
footing as others in that activity. Lutherans affirm the natural-law view that hu
man beings are endowed with the inherent ability to determine right from
wrong by reasoning from their own experience and surroundings, and thereby
to make law that will both nurture human life and punish and deter wrong.8 Yet
they would argue that human will and demonic forces often obscure the right.9
Central Focus of Law

In the Lutheran view, law, like any other human enterprise, must be theocen-

tric, but it is neither salvific nor theocratic. That is, in its civil use, law does not
6. B. A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study of the Theology ofLuther 22, 25-26 (Oxford
1962) (quoting Luthers Sermon on the Seventh Sunday afterTrinity, on Romans 6:19-23).
Luther likened reason to a tool that, properly used, makes things clear, but in itself “do[es]
not guarantee sound results.” Id. at 22. Although Luther repudiated a nominalist doctrine of
justification, he remained a nominalist on creation and law, believing that God was daily cre
ating the world and changing its orders in relation to His purpose, by stark contrast to real
ist natural lawyers like Thomas Aquinas.
7. See H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom ofGod in America 41-42,70-73 (Wesleyan Uni
versity Press, 1988).
8. Gerrish, supra note 6, at 22, 74 11.5; Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career, 1521—
iyyo 115 (E. Theodore Bachmann trans., Fortress 1983).
9. In fact, Luther argued that original sin was so deep a corruption of nature that reason
cannot understand it. Martin Luther, The Smalcald Articles, in Martin Luther’s Basic TheologicalWritings, supra note 2, at 516 (hereinafter The Smalcald Articles)-, George Forell, Faith
Active in Love: An Investigation of the Principles Underlying Luther's Social Ethics 143 (Augs
burg, 1954),
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establish a relationship between human beings and God that can result in their
perfection or salvation; there is no set of laws that, if kept, would result in hu
mans’ repair of the breach they have caused with God. Nor can humans form a
set of laws that fully captures God’s will for humankind, or look to God’s Word
for an immediate “yes” or “no” to resolve a particular justice conflict. Because
God can make good things from God’s creation, even creation corrupted by
evil or unbelief, Lutherans have always claimed that justice can come from

those who do not accept God as the center of their understanding. Still, God’s
will for the good of creation is an ever-present reality even in lawmaking and
application; law that pretends otherwise is a distortion of the truth.
Purpose of Law

The law’s purpose is to serve the neighbor in a way that reflects our situatedness
in particular contexts. The debate about what serves the neighbor, though, is
clearly open-ended, meant for the application of human reason. Lutherans ac
cept that the law can and must be both wrathful and nurturing. As David
Smolin observes in his essay in this volume, the Lutheran tradition is not “paci
fist”: law must be used to restrain, deter, and punish, by physical force if neces
sary, those who evilly destroy the neighbor. Yet law also has a constructive role
in nurturing that same neighbor, by empowering and limiting human institu
tions so that they serve human need. In particular, law helps to preserve the

world by recognizing, defining, and critiquing historical social relations criti
cally at the core of human community, identified by Luther in the sixteenth

century as the church, the household (oeconomia), and the state. The Lutheran
tradition, however, has always recognized that, as God’s co-creative work, new
orders will come into existence as human need demands, and even the tradi
tional orders must be adapted to human need as it changes over time.
Legal Interpretation and Jurisdiction

Following a central Lutheran insight, legal interpretation must account for the
complex reality that human reason is both good and flawed, and that human

imperfection and evil will always distort reason as law is formed, interpreted,
and applied. This fundamental reality suggests a division of legal power that in
sists that civil authority must seek to correct other agencies of human commu

nity while it is continually self-critical, watching for signs that its own delusions
masquerade as public good.
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THE WORK OF OUR HANDS: FORMATION

OF LAW

In American academic circles, the justification of law by process has been a re
curring theme. Any number of legal theorists have suggested that majoritarian
process is an essential condition of making law morally valid because it is
wrong for people to be governed by those laws to which they cannot consent.
Yet “pure” majoritarians are difficult to find, though many qualified majoritarians would prefer pure democracy if it could be practiced under ideal condi
tions.
Recognizing law as a gift that is yet accursed, Lutherans stand almost outside
of these efforts to describe an ideal majoritarianism because they recognize
both the important insights and the equally significant flaws in this discussion.
First, Lutherans must applaud the instinct of majoritarianism, which is to rec
ognize the conscience of the individual person, one critical location of God’s

creative activity along with communities and institutions. Lutherans accept
that human beings have been endowed with tremendous powers to reason
about their own situation in the world, to find a way to nurture, preserve, and
extend all of creation. Llumans’ ability to imagine themselves metaphorically
in those worlds that they cannot physically observe (from an atom’s composi

tion to the reaches of space) and to make the world into usable processes and
objects seems almost limitless in many areas; and this vast power, harnessed to

tackle the problems of human social relations, must inspire and deserve awe.
Thus each person’s conscientious ethical and practical reasoning, as trained
upon a problem of justice in our society, deserves the respect of any political or
der. For Lutheran theorists, the majority’s views, which represent a multiplicity
of such judgments, and the conscientious claim of the dissenting individual are
both entitled to the respect due the activity of a creature of God, a view that
recognizes the inherent goodness of creation’s diversity.
Yet the magnificent power of human reason is put to the test by the awesome
strength of human evil and demonic power in the world, powers that lie both
within and without the heart and soul of every human person. There is no pure
reason; it is always corrupted by the human will. Or as Luther would put it,
“Satan has blinded reason to the natural law and has covered this law with a
veil.”10 In more psychological terms, self-interest, self-justification, and selfio. Paul Althaus, The Ethics ofMartin Luther 27 (Robert C. Schultz trans., Fortress 1972)
(paraphrasing D. Martin Luthers Werke: BriefivechseliyEEmax, 1930-48)).
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delusion are at every moment present in the formation and application 0

law. Citizens must thus simultaneously rejoice in those aspects of dem°
r
.
uuman
governance that encourage the development of community through U
reason and still reject the claim that any democratic decisionmaking pr°
makes law morally right per se, or that process criteria dispositively deci^e
law’s moral validity. With Tocqueville and others, Lutherans recognize th;lt
jorities no less than individuals can make law blind to the needs of the 0 .
and that they can use the power of reason to make evil law seem morall/ °

or even morally responsive to a set of “facts” about human need that exis1

in the mind of the majority. Thus democratic majorities can as easily as
torships imagine that children do not starve in their society, or argue tfiT
should starve for many perfectly plausible reasons, not the least of which)S

■>

the majority has decided they should.
From a Lutheran perspective, however, modern proposals to recogni'66 the
“tyranny of the majority,” which may relocate political power to oppresset^

groups or even reconfer it on individuals and private institutions, are nof nec‘
essarily better solutions. No one can avoid the sins of the will: it is as h^y
(perhaps more likely) that one individual claiming in conscience to be eXemPc
from positive law is driven by the sins of self-interest and self-delusion as u is
that the majority’s decision is so flawed; it is as likely that an oppressed m*nor-

ity will use power corruptly as will a self-satisfied majority.
Luther himself generally expressed a preference, among two evils, for some
amount of organized tyranny in the person of the ruler (or majority) over the
chaotic tyranny of individual choice. Although we cannot know how much of
that preference is context driven, coming out of the political chaos of the later
Reformation period, Luther often demanded that Christians accept the created
order of government until its activities were no longer tolerable, though he did

not hold a consistent position on rebellion throughout his life. His conclusions
driven by practical realities he observed, Luther once suggested that Christians
should not revolt against a clearly evil ruler unless the ruler was so insane that
he could not listen to reason, for while there was the chance to change the
ruler s mind toward good, a short-term tyranny was preferable to destruction of
society through political chaos.11 On another occasion, Luther chided rebel

leaders about the widespread human suffering caused by the rebellions of his
time, suggesting that revolt more often brings evil in the form of human pain
n. George Forell, Luther’s Theology and Domestic Politics, in Martin Luther: Theologian
ofthe Church 113 -14 (Word and World, 1994).
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and death than does living under the yoke of a tyrant.12 Luther regarded with
suspicion rebels’ claims that revolt was necessary to secure human liberty, be
cause he believed that freedom as humans understood it was largely illusory.

Perhaps because he saw that the sins of rebellions are too often visited upon the
innocent rather than the guilty, Luther strongly urged his followers not to de

stroy the foundations of authority; and yet he almost gleefully lobbed grenades
against its walls and roof.
Following Luther, most Lutherans have expressed fairly conservative views
on the right to overturn authority through rebellion, while many have fiercely

challenged particular laws and decisions of the authority. Thus even though
Christians should stand against the authority of a particular government (itself
part of God’s design) only when that authority has jeopardized the preaching of
the Gospel (in statu confessionis), they are in every time and place obliged to de
mand justice for the neighbor, no matter how pure or democratic the “process”
of lawmaking has been. Although Lutheran doctrines of the two kingdoms and
the orders have been distorted in some times and places to justify quietism (as

in some American Lutheran settings) or even cooperation with evil regimes (as
in Nazi Germany), the central tradition is equally adamant that citizenship is a
mandatory human vocation, whether citizens exercise the authority as the

democratic equivalent of “princes” or live under nondemocratic authority. Far
from authorizing passivity in the face of authority, Lutheran doctrine demands
active participation in law; every adult must view his or her citizenship as a call
ing, just as he or she would view a role as a parent, or a worker, or a church

member. As to government service, Luther taught, “you should esteem the
sword of governmental authority as highly as the estate of marriage, or hus
bandry, or any other calling that God has instituted. Just as one can serve God
in the estate of marriage, or in farming or a trade, for the benefit of others—
and must so serve if his neighbor needs it—so one can serve God in govern

ment, and should serve if the need of his neighbor demands it.”13
Thus Christian participation in the formation and reformation of law must

be respectful of authority; supportive of those who try valiantly to carry out the
law; and equally, incessantly and frankly critical of any moment when the law

is designed, interpreted, or enforced unjustly. A Christian, then, can be re
spectful of the office of policing necessary for community protection, cog-

12. Luther noted that God would punish the tyrannical ruler, and if God chose not to do
so, it might be because of sins that we are not prepared to admit. Id. at 114-15.
13. On Temporal Authority, supra note 5, at 674.
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in
nizant of the difficult task each officer faces, while protesting every install
,jjSwhich the police selectively enforce the law, brutalize vulnerable citize
even those who are not innocent—or overlook evil that should be addresse'

a.

THEOCENTRICITY AND THE PURSUIT OF
POLITICS WITHOUT IDOLS

Lutheran theology originated in a historical context in which God’s creative ac
tivity and sovereignty were unquestioned, at least in political arguments. C°n
temporary Lutherans face serious conceptual challenges in a pluralistic ciJl:ure
that has no such consensus, rejecting any theology as a possible basis for
cal justification. American Lutherans have recognized—indeed would ha',e to
recognize—our particular form of government with its modern gloss on
church and state as a form of blessing, and must applaud its role in eradicatinS
civil violence wrongfully justified by religious belief. Yet it would be impossible

for Lutherans to accede to the “common sense” that God is no longer contiuuously involved in the creation and re-creation of human society (though
ing a metaphor to describe that involvement, both direct and through human
action and institutions, is difficult). For God’s creating and sustaining activlt7
is not restricted to some human realms, not lost in the past or waiting in the fu
ture. It is embedded in each judge’s decision, each legislator’s vote, and each
ministrator’s enforcement of the law.
Other Christian and non-Christian alternatives proposing to resolve this
dilemma obscure or deny one critical aspect of God’s creative activity. The sep
aratist move, requiring Christians to withdraw as much as possible from the af

fairs of the world so that God’s work can be more fully expressed in a “purer
community of belief and action, leaves behind a part of the created world to
which Christians are called to minister. The secularist move, to confine reli

gious worldviews and expressions to a private or at least nonpolitical sphere,
similarly denies the sovereignty of God over all creation. The theocratic move,
demanding that law recognize and swear allegiance to a theocentric under
standing of social life through coercion, not only risks the God-given con
science of the religiously other. It also pretends to an idolatry backed by force:
for humans to be God by demanding allegiance of mind and heart to a partic
ular interpretation of God’s will, as they are likely to do according to Lutheran
doctrine, is almost worse than to allow the forces of the Devil to have free rein
over part of the given world.
So the Lutheran conundrum. For a Lutheran to stand mute about God’s cre-
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ative activity in “secular” discussions about law and government is not ethically
(theologically?) possible any more than it should be possible for a Lutheran to
bracket his understanding about God’s action in the world when he thinks
through problems of justice and care with other Christians. Yet to demand that
law precisely reflect their particular theological beliefs is equally problematical
for Lutherans because of the ethical demand to care for the neighbor, a demand
that includes respect for his difference and his different conscience. At the very
least, however, Lutherans can stand in prophetic critique of the pretensions of
anthropocentric lawmaking, even if they cannot find a simple substitute; the
Lutheran claim that law is made for the ordering of human society is critically
different from the claim that human beings are the center of the universe. As
merely the most obvious illustration, Lutherans must be deeply and vocally dis
turbed by environmental law that considers uses of the earth solely according
to human desires, needs, and material aspirations, while equally rejecting fan
ciful projects that “preserve” nature with a pristine aestheticism that diminishes
those human beings whose suffering (famine, disease, impoverishment) can be
alleviated through careful management of resources.
Lutheran recognition of the pretension that human knowledge or values
constructed from the past, a present consensus or an anticipated ideal future,
are the primary, infallible material from which law is created opens a space for
political dialogue with others of differing beliefs. Lutherans believe that Chris
tians can make distinctive theological arguments for the justice of particular le
gal measures or structures while joining theologically differing citizens to reach
consensus or even compromise on practical outcomes. They do so recognizing
that Christian confession is no predicate or indispensable condition to judicial
or legislative virtue: those who are “secular” or other-religious, and even evil
rulers, can be instruments of justice in the world. Thus Christians can fight
over the message without rejecting the messenger; they can recognize the com

petence and virtue of an other-believing judge or legislator or executive—and
even the rightfulness of that lawmaker s decisions—while disagreeing with her
justifications for law.
Third, Lutherans can deny the power of “isms” that create legal structures
around them, particularly those that pretend to perfectionism. Even if they ac
cept the insights on the human condition that have given rise to some of these
“isms,” Lutherans must unalterably oppose any juridical strategy that promises
the salvation or ultimate perfection of individual human beings or human
community. Thus although Lutherans can, for instance, accept the Marxist

recognition that modern society has alienated human beings from their own

395

396

Failinger and Keifert

work, they cannot accept the ultimate conclusion that humans can, by them
selves, achieve reunification of the spiritual and material by a political pro
gramme, whether it is the dictatorship of the proletariat or unfettered capital
ism.

THE NEIGHBOR'S GOOD IN THE WORK

OF THE LAW

Simply put, the central focus of the civil law is to serve the neighbor. Lutherans
view the responsibility to love one’s neighbor as the critical insight of the nat
ural law, not as a “Christian duty.” It is a seeming paradox of Lutheran theology
that Christians do make a loving response to the neighbor because they are
saved by grace, while at the same time they with others are bound by the natural
law to respond in love. Thus for Lutherans the “law of love” is neither distinctly
Christian nor a form of obligation imposed on one by virtue of one’s salvation.
As an insight of natural law, loving service is a demand upon all persons who
can exercise reason and a call to which all humans are accountable, irrespective
of their religious beliefs or salvation, irrespective of whether they are virtuous
or thoroughly evil, rulers or ruled.

Thus civil law is not only permitted but required to reflect God’s demand
that the neighbor be served. That this prescription is exceedingly general does
not suggest its complexity. First, Lutheranism accepts the paradox that law is
situated as well as universal: to do justice, law must always reflect the circum
stances of those who demand justice and the historical, cultural, and political
setting in which justice is dispensed. Second, Lutheranism imagines “doing jus
tice” as a complex relation driven by virtues, not rules. Third, the notions of
both “service” and “neighbor” are broadly defined to embrace a strong ethic of
responsibility to the whole world.
Although Lutherans understand justice to be contextual, the situatedness of
law does not imply the partiality of justice, nor justify the use of power to es
cape justice or to exclude any groups from its protection. Luther described a

radical egalitarianism in the application of the law, although its application to
Christians is complicated. Thus Luther could say, “All who are not Christians
belong to the kingdom of the world and are under the law,” while demanding
that even those few who are Christians in faith and deed obey the law. They
must obey, not only as a loving example to the ungodly but also because “no
one is by nature Christian or righteous; but altogether sinful and wicked, [so]
God through the law puts them all under restraint so they dare not wilfully im-
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plement their wickedness in actual deeds.”14 Moreover, the “neighbor” to
whom both government and individuals owe the duty of care is not defined by
relationship or history; he or she is identified only by need, for “a man does not
live for himself alone in this moral body to work for it alone, but he lives also
for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others and not for himself.”15
Thus Luther could counterintuitively call for exercise of the sword on behalf of
others even while one should not be prepared to defend oneself.
In addition, Luther rejected relativism on justice: he accepted that the nat
ural law is the foundation for our reasoning about justice. Yet Lutherans have
not imagined natural law as a set of fixed, universal principles, objectively sep
arate from the world to which they apply and static from age to age. Rather,
they have understood natural law as a dynamic, ever-changing source of
knowledge about God’s demand of, and concern for, human well-being, a
source for correction of human short sightedness and self-interest, but reliant
on human reason to apply natural law to particular controversies in particular
periods.
Second, justice is the fruit of legislative and judicial virtue, not arid applica
tion of abstract principles to the facts; it is the result of the natural call to love

the neighbor, expressed as “I should do as I would be done by.” As Luther
claimed, “For when you judge according to love you will easily decide and ad
just matters without any lawbooks. But when you ignore love and the natural
law you will never hit upon the solution that pleases God, though you have de
voured all the lawbooks and jurists. Instead, the more you depend on them, the
further they will lead you astray.”16
Third, though the concept of service to the neighbor may seem “soft,” in

fact, Lutherans have explicitly articulated how the law preserves, including
Luther’s well-known, seemingly pessimistic emphasis on its restraint of the
wicked. Luther’s writings particularly stress the use of law in incapacitating and
generally deterring wrongdoers: “The unrighteous do nothing that the law de
mands; therefore, they need the law to instruct, constrain and compel them to
do good.... [If the law did not restrain them], men would devour one an14. Id. at 664.
15. The Freedom of a Christian, supra note 4, at 616.
16. Id. Luthers description of the lawmaker’s tasks reflects his ambivalence at times on
whether Christians are particularly suited to govern: he demands “true confidence [in God]
and earnest prayer,” love and Christian service toward those ruled, “untrammeled reason and
unfettered judgment” toward subordinates; and “restrained severity and firmness” toward
evildoers. On Temporal Authority, supra note 5, at 700, 702.
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other, seeing that the whole world is evil. . . . No one could support wife and
child, feed himself and serve God. The world would be reduced to chaos. . . .
[God] has subjected [those who are not true believers] to the word so that, even
though they would like to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and if
they do practice it they cannot do so without fear or with success and im
punity.”17 Luther’s primary focus here is the protection of citizens who fall prey
to the wrongdoer’s harm, though retribution plays a minor chord in Luther’s
work: while exhorting Christians to let themselves be “despoiled and slan
dered” if necessary, he demands that they seek “vengeance, justice, protection
and help” on behalf of others.
Positive law also serves to correct human behavior and to teach those who
have not been transformed by grace what is expected of them under the natural
law. Luther was fairly realistic about the fact that citizens have different intel
lectual, moral, and spiritual capabilities for discerning what natural law re
quires, and viewed positive law as one way of teaching those who could not
think deeply about questions of natural justice, or whose other duties did not
permit sustained reflection on these issues.
One function of the civil law that has been most overlooked in some Amer
ican Lutheran communities is its role in nurturing individuals and the com
munity. Luther believed that government had an affirmative responsibility to
care for public needs, anticipating that governments might provide not only
police protection and criminal justice but also fire protection, medical care, and
public education.18 In some cases, such as education, Luther saw these respon
sibilities as a public function because the family was unable or unwilling to do
its duty: parents were not always competent to educate, and many lacked time
to spare from meeting the basic material needs of the family.19 In other areas,
such as medical care, he considered it efficient for cities and states to care for
those who needed it, noting that governmental hospitals and nursing homes
17. Id. at 665, 664.
18. Martin Luther, Whether One May Flee from a Deadly Plague, and Martin Luther, To
the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Establish and Maintain Christian
Schools, in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, supra note 2, at 711-12, 738, 743 (here
inafter referred to as Plague and To the Councilmen, respectively).
19. Luther noted that even if some parents “lack the goodness and decency to educate
their children,” they should not be neglected merely because their parents were ne’er-dowells. In fact, Luther pointed out that such uneducated children, the product of cruel
homes, would “poison and pollute other children until at last the whole city is ruined.” To
the Councilmen, supra note 18, 711-12.
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would be “a fine, commendable, and Christian arrangement to which everyone
should offer generous help and contributions, particularly the government.”20
It is important to reemphasize, however, that Lutherans have traditionally
distinguished the civil use of the law from spiritual uses of the law. Most im
portant, these distinctions have emphasized that obedience to the law cannot
repair the breach between human beings and God and, in terms of one’s salva
tion, is virtually beside the point, because even the perfect keeping of the law,

were it possible, is not a sufficient work in God’s sight.
Within a discussion of the civil use of the law, moreover, this clear distinc
tion between God’s spiritual realm and God’s earthly realm would make
Lutherans skeptical of political movements, legal structures, or programs that
purport to provide a complete answer to the ills of society, or even to the needs
of a particular individual. To suggest, for instance, that a criminal-corrections

program or a set of welfare regulations will “reform” an individual in both heart
and mind is to deny the spiritual aspects of human existence and to brashly pre
tend to a competence that is God’s alone. Luther did respect the power of law
to encourage positive patterns of behavior, if not internal reformation, both by
teaching what is expected and by threatening sanctions if those expectations
were not met. Moreover, he believed that children could be taught what moral
activity was expected of them and, to a limited extent, schooled in moral
virtues. Yet Luther was skeptical about the role of education in changing the
heart and will of sinful human beings, who knowing what they should do
refuse to accept or do it. And because Luther saw that sinful human beings
would create flawed social systems, the agencies of social and economic life
could be also expected to reflect self-aggrandizement, dishonesty, and distor
tion of the common good, even as they could nurture, sustain, and protect hu
man community.
The Lutheran focus on human responsibility as defined by an individual’s

office, a concept that rejects the former primacy of priestly and religious call
ings, drives this constructive understanding of the law. Luther uses the term of
fice or station (Stand) to define the life-place into which all people are put to
make their contribution to the need of the neighbor.21 The focus of moral
20. Plague, supranote 18, at 743.
21. There is some inconsistency in the way Lutheran writers use these terms. The noted
Lutheran ethicist Paul Althaus suggests that Luther used the terms station, orders, duties, in
stitutions, offices, functions, or hierarchies somewhat interchangeably, especially after 1522.
Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther 36, 39 (trans. Robert C. Schultz, Fortress, 1972).
Others might distinguish between the great orders or governances, such as family, and the
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judgment in shaping law must be on the unique and multiple offices one occu
pies as a worker, parent, spouse, or citizen. These offices must be exercised dili
gently by the person who occupies them so that certain critical human orders
that make it possible for human beings to flourish may be maintained. Thus
the office of parent is vital to the flourishing of the age-old order of the house
hold (oeconomia) or family; the office of pastor to the order of the church; the
office of judge to the functioning of the state. Individuals occupy these orders
not primarily by personal choice but rather by being found where they are,
though Lutherans would not understand by this that people are “fated” into or
ders and have no control over their destiny.

The concept of office both constrains and permits freedom, as understood
by moderns. The constraints of an office are those responsibilities that the per
son who holds this office is bound to meet diligently and do well, even if his im
mediate choice would be to escape them. On the other hand, the orders are
shaped by the ongoing co-creative activity of God, so that definition and con
tours of these orders may change from age to age, because the key principle
defining the orders is whether they meet human need as reflected in God’s will
for God’s creation. As a simple example, the fact that the state was aristocratic
in medieval times does not settle the question of what form of state best meets
human needs in modern times. Similarly, the fact that women and men held
certain responsibilities in the family in Luther’s time does not forever lock them
into “natural” and unchanging roles.
Modern law defines with some complexity those orders and institutions be
lieved to be essential for the flourishing of human community. For instance,
corporate forms are largely dictated by the states; marriage is a statutory con
tract embracing defined responsibilities of spouses toward each other and their
children; and vast bodies of rules define even the constraints on government.
Because for Lutherans the orders are constantly being created and revised, the
state bears a heavy responsibility in trying to think through how these orders

should be continuously restructured to preserve human community. Extremely
individualistic or static conceptions of orders would be incompatible with both
the form and the fluidity characteristic of these orders. On one hand, tradi
tional Lutherans would not accept a state in which all responsibilities were de
signed by individual contract, so that moral and legal accountability would ap-

specific role or office, such as father, that the person occupies within those orders; or between
office or station (Stand), those places where we are to obey God, and a persons vocation
(Beruf), to which he knows God has called him.
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ply only to those ditties that one “chooses,” because they do believe that indi
viduals are called into offices by God and the neighbor’s need. Moreover, they
would be skeptical about whether an individual, given the power to “choose”
the terms of his engagement with others, would order his responsibilities fully
to serve his neighbor. For instance, it is likely, Lutherans would suggest, that
most individuals, if permitted to “choose” their marital responsibilities, would
look to their own self-interest before considering the interests of even a beloved

spouse.
On the other hand, law must structure these critical human institutions in a
sufficiently flexible way that people can meet the varied offices they occupy or
vocations to which they are called. Thus marriage law that utilized a monolithic
and static concept of gender or parentage to define womens and men’s obliga
tions so rigidly that it did not account for conflicting callings of particular in
dividuals would be wrong. For instance, legal regulation of family roles or eco
nomics that would make it difficult for a spouse to practice her vocation as a
healer, or for a father to support children from his first marriage, would be
problematical.

OFFICE, JURISDICTION, AND INTERPRETATION:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF RESTRAINT

The concept of office or vocation within these orders of creation also sets
boundaries on the extent to which the state should be involved in forming and
regulating human institutions, and how it should be structured to do so. The
central anthropological paradox, that human beings are a good creation of God
and at the same time deeply sinful, self-trusting, and self-regarding creatures,
must necessarily be at the heart of good-faith attempts to define the diverse re
sponsibilities of those who occupy various offices within the order of the state.
Those who define offices and those who hold them must be other-critical, will

ing to hold accountable other office holders who exceed their trust and their
competence, while self-critically ensuring that they themselves do not venture
beyond either their duties or their gifts because of arrogance, greed, or delu

sions that they alone have properly understood the good.
Thus the Lutheran view of legal authority would not only be concerned
about limiting power, as we usually contemplate when we discuss separation of
powers or protection of the press as a check on the excesses of other branches of
government. It would also demand the development of an affirmative under

standing of the competencies and weaknesses of different branches and offices
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ment, and would expect them to create structures that account foi
t eir weaknesses and exercise their competencies. Indeed, Luther even allowed

„ C . mC °^ces are simply intrinsically evil: though the office of “soldier is
a ministry of love and a vocation,” the office of “torturer” is still morally
wrong/2

To take the most debated example in American constitutional jurispru.
*m*ts judicial review—Lutheran conceptions of the orders and
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S bLens, by protecting power of those officeholders who are abus1,1 u j°r yLexcludinSthe vulnerable from the human community, a judge
e uty ound to use the power of his office to counter the state s action,
ven 1 positive law supported it. Similarly, in the Lutheran view, majorities and

p °^s can be just as corrupt as individuals, so a legal regime that put its
,
maj°ritarian decisions or individual rights, neglecting the sin inn ot individuals and institutions, would be soon corrupted. Con•
,-H 1 m°raIly bisightful Lutheran judge would be careful about sub■p > ,
? sonaJ judgment for the legislature, whether democratic or nor,
* the legislature were acting within the appropriate boundaries of its office to
.

restrain an protect, and the process of deliberation reflected lawmakers’ care-
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respective powers or “rights” of the state and federal governments under the
Constitution might be transformed into a debate about what decisions each
branch of government is uniquely situated to make and to enforce due to its
ability to understand context, its historical contributions to a well-ordered and
just society, its resources (including human ones), and its historical tendencies
toward oppression of various kinds.
Internal to each branch of government, the problem of creating and inter
preting the law would be similarly viewed in the context of conflicting de
mands that would rule out absolute positions of interpretation. A strict posi
tivism or textualism that rejected the role of human reason and compassion in
determining the need of the neighbor in a particular case would be equally as

unappealing to Lutherans as a jurisprudence of unreflective personal prejudices
or instincts not geared to the search for earthly well-being from within the tra
dition of natural principles of justice. A Lutheran interpretive scheme would
be marked by flexibility, for God can make things new in the world, and yet re
spect for the text and tradition as the embodied wisdom of others who have
fought different evils and made the same—or other—mistakes.

For Lutherans, the ambiguous terrain of the postmodern world is familiar ter
ritory. To turn one’s face toward God is to escape neither the darkness of the
present world nor its possibility. It is not, indeed, to turn one’s face at all, but to
find the abruptly and momentarily unmasked hiddenness of God in the most
daily of difficult tasks, the malting of law for the good of the neighbor. In this
territory of law, hope acknowledges its own powerlessness, wrath is love, and

those who stand placed in God’s world burst into a future they have made and
unmade with their own hands, crafted and yet crippled. Lutherans stand
against every attempt to define the civil law as salvation or soulless, as para
mount or irrelevant, for they see the preserving hand of God moving imper
ceptibly in the human debate about the law for the neighbor’s welfare. For
Lutherans, law is bound authority, creative restraint, suspicious passion for life.
It is not an “either” to the “or” of the gospel, but makes its own home in the
works of God.
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